Legal malpractice action dismissed based upon doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

The Appellate Division, in Kleinman v Weisman Law Group, P.C., 176 AD3d 1046 [2d Dept 2019], dismissed a former client’s legal malpractice action based upon the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court stated as follows:

In 2013, the defendant Weisman Law Group, P.C. (hereinafter the defendant firm), commenced an action against the plaintiff to recover unpaid legal fees in the Nassau County District Court. The plaintiff asserted a counterclaim, alleging that he was overbilled by the defendant firm. A judgment was entered in favor of the defendant firm and against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed the judgment of the Nassau County District Court to the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts, which affirmed the judgment (see Weisman Law Group, P.C. v. Kleinman, 60 Misc.3d 133[A], 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 51042[U], 2018 WL 3309514 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018] ). In 2016, the plaintiff commenced the instant action against the defendants asserting causes of action alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and legal malpractice.

Scales of justice illustrating article about legal malpractice.

The plaintiff contends that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in the instant case, as the Nassau County District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his counterclaim in the prior action. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Nassau County District Court did have jurisdiction over his counterclaim pursuant to Uniform District Court Act Section 208(b), as the counterclaim was for money only. The doctrine of res judicata precludes the plaintiff from litigating the claims set forth in his complaint, as a judgment on the merits exists in the prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter (see Matter of Josey v. Goord, 9 N.Y.3d 386, 389, 849 N.Y.S.2d 497, 880 N.E.2d 18; Matter of Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d 260, 269, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269). New York has adopted the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, so that once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims between the same parties or those in privity with them arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy (see Matter of Josey v. Goord, 9 N.Y.3d at 389–390, 849 N.Y.S.2d 497, 880 N.E.2d 18; Matter of Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d at 269, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269; *124 O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158; Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v. Feldstein, 72 A.D.3d 890, 893, 901 N.Y.S.2d 643).

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s causes of action are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same (see Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487; Williams v. New York City Tr. Auth., 171 A.D.3d 990, 97 N.Y.S.3d 692). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies here, as the issues in both actions are identical, the issue in the prior action was actually litigated and decided, there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the action, the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits, and the defendant Rachel J. Weisman was in privity with the defendant firm (see Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 1, 17, 6 N.Y.S.3d 206, 29 N.E.3d 215; Williams v. New York City Tr. Auth., 171 A.D.3d at 991–992, 97 N.Y.S.3d 692; Karimian v. Time Equities, Inc., 164 A.D.3d 486, 83 N.Y.S.3d 227).

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…issue of collateral estoppel concerning a matter previously litigated…

In Gobindram v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 175 AD3d 586, 589-91 [2d Dept 2019], the state court considered the issue of collateral estoppel concerning a matter previously litigated in the federal bankruptcy court. The court held:

Scales of justice

“The doctrine of in pari delicto mandates that the courts will not intercede to resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers” (Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 464, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508, 938 N.E.2d 941). “[T]he principle that a wrongdoer should not profit from his own misconduct is so strong in New York that … the defense applies even in difficult cases and should not be weakened by exceptions” (id. at 464, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508, 938 N.E.2d 941 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). “The defense requires intentional conduct on the part of the plaintiff” (Sacher v. Beacon Assoc. Mgt. Corp., 114 A.D.3d 655, 657, 980 N.Y.S.2d 121; see Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d at 474, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508, 938 N.E.2d 941).

Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same (see Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295, 303, 740 N.Y.S.2d 252, 766 N.E.2d 914; Shifer v. Shifer, 165 A.D.3d 721, 723, 85 N.Y.S.3d 92). There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling (see Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d at 303–304, 740 N.Y.S.2d 252, 766 N.E.2d 914; Shifer v. Shifer, 165 A.D.3d at 723, 85 N.Y.S.3d 92).

Here, the federal courts in the plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceeding finally adjudicated a mixed issue of law and fact identical to that raised by the in pari delicto defense asserted by the defendants in the current legal malpractice action, i.e., the plaintiff’s culpability in connection with the filing of the inaccurate bankruptcy petition. Those courts found that the plaintiff knowingly and intentionally made a false and fraudulent statement under oath by swearing that he had read the SOFA and that it was true and correct, and that the plaintiff’s alleged reliance on the defendants to accurately prepare the bankruptcy submissions did not negate his fraudulent intent. These findings established that the plaintiff was in pari delicto with the defendants to the extent that he alleges they acted negligently in preparing and filing the inaccurate bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss so much of the legal malpractice cause of action as sought to recover damages for the defendants’ preparation and filing of the inaccurate bankruptcy petition based on the doctrines of collateral estoppel and in pari delicto.

However, we disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss so much of the legal malpractice cause of action as sought to recover damages for the defendants’ failure to amend the bankruptcy petition. The findings of the federal courts regarding the knowing and fraudulent conduct on the plaintiff’s part related solely to the initial filing; they made no determination that the plaintiff acted knowingly and fraudulently in failing to file an amended petition. Accordingly, that part of the plaintiff’s legal malpractice cause of action is not subject to dismissal on the grounds of collateral estoppel and in pari delicto.

As an alternative ground for affirmance (see Parochial Bus Sys. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 539, 545–546, 470 N.Y.S.2d 564, 458 N.E.2d 1241), the defendants contend that the legal malpractice cause of action should have been dismissed in its entirety pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), since the parties’ evidentiary submissions on the motion established that the plaintiff hired subsequent counsel who had ample opportunity to rectify their alleged error in this regard (see e.g. Perks v. Lauto & Garabedian, 306 A.D.2d 261, 262, 760 N.Y.S.2d 231). This contention lacks merit.

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511; see Nonnon v. City of New York, 9 N.Y.3d 825, 827, 842 N.Y.S.2d 756, 874 N.E.2d 720). “When evidentiary material is considered, the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether [she or] he has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, … dismissal should not eventuate” (Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17).

Here, the record reveals that the plaintiff did not retain the services of new counsel until December 2011. By that time, the bankruptcy trustee had already noted inconsistencies in the petition and requested an accounting relating to the omitted tax refund transfers, and the plaintiff’s creditors had commenced the adversary proceeding. Giving the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d at 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511), this time line suggests that the defendants, not the subsequent attorney, represented the plaintiff at the time when a voluntary amendment to the petition could have significantly reduced the prospect of a finding that the plaintiff made a false and fraudulent statement in the bankruptcy petition (see In re Tully, 818 F.2d 106, 111 [1st Cir.]; Matter of Kilson, 83 B.R. 198, 203 [D. Conn.]). Accordingly, at this preliminary stage of the litigation, the defendants have failed to conclusively demonstrate that the plaintiff’s subsequent attorney had a sufficient opportunity to correct their alleged error in failing to amend the petition, such that they did not proximately cause any damages flowing from that error (see generally Tooma v. Grossbarth, 121 A.D.3d 1093, 1096, 995 N.Y.S.2d 593; Grant v. LaTrace, 119 A.D.3d 646, 647, 990 N.Y.S.2d 227).

We find unpersuasive the defendants’ additional alternative contention that the legal malpractice cause of action was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) because that cause of action belongs to the bankruptcy estate and the plaintiff lacked standing to assert it. “On a defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint based upon the plaintiff’s alleged lack of standing, the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff’s lack of standing” (BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Rychik, 161 A.D.3d 924, 925, 77 N.Y.S.3d 522; see CPLR 3211[a][3]; MLB Sub I, LLC v. Bains, 148 A.D.3d 881, 881–882). “[T]he motion will be defeated if the plaintiff’s submissions raise a question of fact as to its standing” (U.S. Bank N.A. v. Clement, 163 A.D.3d 742, 743, 81 N.Y.S.3d 116 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see MLB Sub I, LLC v. Bains, 148 A.D.3d at 882, 50 N.Y.S.3d 410).

Here, in response to the defendants’ prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s legal malpractice cause of action was the property of the bankruptcy estate (see Wright v. Meyers & Spencer, LLP, 46 A.D.3d 805, 849 N.Y.S.2d 274; Williams v. Stein, 6 A.D.3d 197, 198, 775 N.Y.S.2d 255; In re Strada Design Assoc., Inc., 326 B.R. 229, 237–240 [S.D. N.Y.]), the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the bankruptcy trustee had abandoned the cause of action in accordance with Bankruptcy Code (11 USC) § 554(a) and had authorized the plaintiff to pursue it. Accordingly, dismissal of the legal malpractice cause of action for lack of standing is not available at this juncture.

R. A. Klass
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Sometimes, a lawsuit is dismissed based upon the concept of claim preclusion…

Sometimes, a lawsuit is dismissed based upon the concept of claim preclusion or collateral estoppel, which was defined by the court in Sang Seok Na v Schietroma, 172 AD3d 1263 [2d Dept 2019]:

“ The doctrine of collateral estoppel, a narrower species of res judicata, precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same ” (Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when: “ (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits ” (Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 1, 17, 6 N.Y.S.3d 206, 29 N.E.3d 215 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

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“Slow Down, You Move Too Fast”

Simon & Garfunkel,
The 59th Street Bridge Song (Feelin’ Groovy)

Rabbit with yellow fur standing next to gray and yellow turtle illustrating article by Richard Klass about nonresident plaintiffs posting Security for Costs.

A foreign company sued a New York State resident, seeking to force the sale of his house in order to satisfy its judgment.  The company existed under New Jersey law with a New Jersey corporate address.  The house was located in Nassau County.

Petition to Sell House

The judgment creditor’s petition to sell real property alleged that there was sufficient equity in the house exceeding the homestead exemption and existing mortgage lien.  The petition further alleged that attempts to execute on the judgment debtor’s personal property failed and the creditor had otherwise been unable to satisfy its judgment.  Combined, these allegations would normally be enough to satisfy the pleading requirements under CPLR 5203, 5206 and 5238.

In response to the petition, the debtor/homeowner retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to defend the proceeding in order to retain his house.  The defenses put up included the fact that the mortgage lender had already begun foreclosure proceedings and there was a question as to the validity of the claim that there was any net equity in the property.  Further, since the house was owned by the debtor with his wife as a “ tenancy by the entirety, ” the house could not be sold without consideration of her property rights.

Stopping the Creditor in its tracks

Sometimes, a debtor needs a respite from the continual attacks by creditors.  One way to accomplish this is by a bankruptcy filing, in which the automatic stay imposed upon filing stops the pecking at a debtor’s assets by creditors.  Another way to slow down a creditor is to temporarily stay the lawsuit while the debtor and his family “ circle the wagons ” to either gather up strong defenses or develop an orderly plan in which debts will be repaid or settled.  An effective method of getting this pause is by requesting that the judge stay the lawsuit of a non-New York State creditor until the plaintiff/creditor posts security for the costs of the action.

Security for Costs

New York court rules require nonresident plaintiffs maintaining lawsuits in New York courts to post security for the costs for which they would be liable if their lawsuits were unsuccessful.  CPLR 8501(a) provides that, “ except where the plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed as a poor person or is the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding, upon motion by the defendant without notice, the court or judge thereof shall order security for costs to be given by the plaintiffs where none of them is a domestic corporation, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state or a resident of the state when the motion is made. ” CPLR 8502 provides that until security for costs is given pursuant to court order, all proceedings other than to review or vacate such order shall be stayed, and that if the plaintiff shall not have given security for costs at the expiration of 30 days from the date of the order, the court may dismiss the complaint upon motion by the defendant.

Security for costs is a device ordinarily used against a nonresident plaintiff to make sure if he loses the case, he will not return home and leave the defendant with a costs judgment that can be enforced only in the plaintiff’s home state.  By directing a nonresident to post a bond, the defendant is protected from frivolous lawsuits and is assured that, if successful, he will be able to recover costs from the plaintiff.

In rebuffing a challenge to the constitutionality of the requirement of security for costs imposed upon a nonresident plaintiff, the court in Clement v. Durban, 147 AD3d 39 [2016] aff’d 32 NY3d 337 [2018] cert denied 139 S.Ct. 2649 [2019] held that the court rules do not deprive nonresident plaintiffs of reasonable and adequate access to New York courts and, thus, are constitutional.  Where nonresidents are subject to different treatment than New York residents, there must be reasonable grounds for diversity of treatment (so as to prevent discrimination against citizens of other states).  Disparity of treatment of nonresidents is permitted in situations where there are valid, independent reasons for it; in this situation, deterring frivolous or harassing lawsuits and preventing prevailing defendants from having to chase plaintiffs into foreign jurisdictions to collect their judgments are considered valid reasons.

Upon motion by the defendant requesting that the plaintiff post a bond as security for costs, the judge granted the motion and directed the nonresident plaintiff to post security in the amount of $10,000 for costs.  The plaintiff did not do so within the 30 day period after the order and, accordingly, the court dismissed the lawsuit.

Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2019 Richard A. Klass. Credits: Photo of Richard Klass by Rob Abruzzese, 2019. Marketing agency: The Innovation Works, Inc. (www.TheInnovationWorks.com)  Image at top of page: Shutterstock

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[ nonresident plaintiffs ]

Appellate court reversed the court order dismissing the action on the law firm’s motion to dismiss.

In an action by a client against a law firm for legal malpractice, the appellate court reversed the court order dismissing the action on the law firm’s motion to dismiss. The court held:

“ To state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession; and (2) that the attorney’s breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff actual and ascertainable damages ” (Dempster v. Liotti, 86 A.D.3d 169, 176, 924 N.Y.S.2d 484 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leder v. Spiegel, 9 N.Y.3d 836, 837, 840 N.Y.S.2d 888, 872 N.E.2d 1194). Here, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the plaintiff stated a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice (see Tooma v. Grossbarth, 121 A.D.3d at 1095–1096, 995 N.Y.S.2d 593; Endless Ocean, LLC v. Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo, 113 A.D.3d 587, 589, 979 N.Y.S.2d 84; Reynolds v. Picciano, 29 A.D.2d 1012, 1012, 289 N.Y.S.2d 436). The evidentiary submissions did not establish that a material fact alleged in the complaint is not a fact at all and that no significant dispute exists regarding it (see Bodden v. Kean, 86 A.D.3d at 526, 927 N.Y.S.2d 137). Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff was entitled to commence this legal malpractice action even though the underlying personal injury action was still pending, as the legal malpractice action accrued, at the latest, in November 2014 (see Johnston v. Raskin, 193 A.D.2d 786, 787, 598 N.Y.S.2d 272).

Lopez v Lozner & Mastropietro, P.C., 166 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2018]

 

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In Pari Delicto

In Pari Delicto — party’s wrongful doing — can bar a lawsuit.

“The doctrine of in pari delicto bars a party that has been injured as a result of its own intentional wrongdoing from recovering for those injuries from another party whose equal or lesser fault contributed to the loss (see Kirschner v KPMG, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508, 938 N.E.2d 941 [2010]; [in pari delicto “mandates that the courts will not intercede to resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers”]; Chemical Bank v. Stahl, 237 A.D.2d 231, 232, 655 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1997] [in pari delicto “requires immoral or unconscionable conduct that makes the wrongdoing of the party against which it is asserted at least equal to that of the party asserting it”]).” Rosenbach v Diversified Group, Inc., 85 AD3d 569, 570 [1st Dept 2011].

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Tender of Payment

A seldom-used tactic in litigation is the “tender” of payment by a defendant of an amount which is believed to be due to the plaintiff. If the proper amount is tendered, and the plaintiff does not accept that amount, then the defendant will not be found liable for interest and court costs.

This legal tactic was successfully used by the author in a case involving the building of a large boys’ yeshiva. The yeshiva purchased a building to tear it down and construct a new school. The prior owner took back a mortgage from the yeshiva for $900,000, with interest-only payments for 15 years and no prepayments allowed. Shortly after the purchase, the yeshiva obtained work permits to demolish the existing structure to build the new school building.

The mortgagee/prior owner brought an injunction action, claiming that the demolition of the existing structure violated the terms of the mortgage (a common clause in the form of mortgage states that the mortgagee’s consent is needed before alteration of the structure on the mortgaged premises in order to protect the value of the collateral). During the course of ongoing court conferences, the yeshiva offered to pay off the mortgage in full, but the mortgagee was insistent on obtaining not only the principal amount of $900,000 but also the future 14 1/2 years’ worth of interest (a windfall of about $1.2 million).

The mortgagee then decided to unilaterally declare a default under the mortgage, alleging that the disconnection of the water and electric lines amounted to an alteration of the structure; her attorney served an “acceleration notice,” demanding the payment of the mortgage in full plus accrued interest.

From an initial review of the situation, it looked bleak for the yeshiva. But, upon further examination, the concept of “tender” saved the day! The yeshiva collected pledges totaling $911,000 (the principal amount plus accrued interest to the date of tender) and deposited that amount with the Clerk of Kings County as a “tender.” A motion was then made to dismiss both the injunction and foreclosure actions based upon the tender.

The court held that there was a valid tender, since the mortgagee accelerated the mortgage note, seeking the unpaid principal amount with “accrued” interest. Based upon the ambiguity of the language of the mortgage note, “accrued interest” may have meant interest accrued only to the date of default or future interest past the date of default.

Tender can be effectively utilized in situations where the defendant expects to owe something to the plaintiff but nowhere near the amount claimed. A tender can place a greater onus on the plaintiff to substantiate additional damages. Further, it can be a good method of settling a case by offering the plaintiff an amount which it may be willing to accept to terminate the litigation.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

R. A. Klass
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Debt Collection Tips: Motions to Dismiss Affirmative Defenses or Counterclaims

After a suit is filed against a debtor to collect upon a debt, the defendant will file an Answer which may include “affirmative defenses” or “counterclaims.”  These allegations must be handled with vigilance from the onset to attempt successful recovery in the litigation.

An “affirmative defense” is a defense to a law suit which must be proved by the defendant.  Examples of affirmative defenses would include, e.g., bankruptcy, statute of limitations, improper service, and accord and satisfaction.  The notion is that those types of defenses would likely be determinative to the claim.  Therefore, the defendant must assert them in the Answer so as not to “surprise” the plaintiff-creditor at the time of trial.  Some affirmative defenses must be asserted either pre-Answer or in the Answer, or they are deemed waived by the defendant.  After receipt of the Answer, the plaintiff’s counsel should scan the Answer to identify any affirmative defenses and assess their viability.  To the extent that an affirmative defense seems frivolous, meritless, or superfluous, an appropriate motion to dismiss the affirmative defense should be made sooner rather than later.  The court will then determine whether to sustain the affirmative defense or dismiss it from the onset of the litigation.

As to any counterclaims which may be asserted in the Answer, a careful review must take place as to whether it relates to the matter complained of in the complaint, or relates to a separate matter.  Sometimes, the plaintiff will have an insurance policy which covers the counterclaim, and the insurance company will provide a defense to the counterclaim separate from the prosecution of the underlying suit.  If it is deemed that the counterclaim “fails to state a valid cause of action,” then an appropriate motion may be brought to dismiss the same.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.


R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Cause of Action for Interference with Contract

A cause of action is properly alleged against defendants for their interference with contract when the following elements are set forth:

The Second Department held, in Miller v. Theodore-Tassy, 92 AD3d 650 [2012], that:

To prevail on a cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must establish “the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party, defendant’s knowledge of that contract, defendant’s intentional procurement of the third-party’s breach of the contract without justification, actual breach of the contract, and damages resulting therefrom” citing Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 424.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.


R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Statute Of Limitations For Actions Against Public Authority

A person has one year from the date a claim accrues to commence an action against a public authority such as LIRR (Public Authorities Law Section 1276(2). The complaint must contain an allegation that at least 30 days have elapsed since the authority was presented with a demand or claim and that the authority has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the claim. This “stay” of 30 days is not counted as part of the limitations period and the plaintiff therefore may serve a complaint at any time up to one year and 30 days after the claim has accrued.
by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

———–
copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.


R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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